

This pattern enshrines the presence of drones above other countries, threatening to undermine their sovereignty, and is reflected by U.S. Second, countries can use drones strategically with multilateral constraint, which we refer to as aerial occupation. We define this pattern of drone warfare as “ over-the-horizon,” implying countries use strikes to attack terrorists without deploying boots on the ground. First, countries can use drones strategically with unilateral constraint. Variation in the use and constraint of drones suggests four patterns of strikes that are emerging globally. In a recent study, we show that such approval is associated with higher public support and perceived legitimacy for a strike, which is cross-nationally consistent in France and the U.S. A well-known multilateral constraint is United Nations (U.N.) approval for strikes. Multilateral constraints obligate states to meet the oversight requirements of other countries. In May 2013, President Barack Obama adopted a “ near” certainty standard of no civilian casualties during U.S. Unilateral constraints are imposed by officials within a single country. used drones strategically to “ decapitate” al-Qaida in Pakistan.Ĭountries can also use strikes with different constraints to prevent consequences, namely civilian casualties. Political officials can also use drones strategically to meet larger political and military objectives. So, for example, similar to a patrol or raid, commanders can use drones tactically during engagements with an enemy to achieve limited military objectives, such as defending ground forces. The globalization of drone warfareĬountries can use drones tactically, which is to say on the battlefield, or as part of a strategy designed to achieve broader military and political objectives.

This has important implications for how countries choose to employ drones going forward. counterterrorism strikes no longer explain how most countries use drones and the public’s perceptions of legitimate strikes result from why and how drones are used. Together, these findings suggest that U.S. Finally, this in-group and out-group effect reflects unique assumptions that underline perceptions of legitimacy. Second, American and French citizens perceive certain patterns of drone warfare as more legitimate than others. First, variation in how a country uses and constrains the use of drones can shape perceptions of legitimate strikes in different ways. Our research consisted of a survey experiment and resulted in three key findings. French citizens, then, provide a convenient litmus test for non-U.S. We focused on the United States as a benchmark and included France, which has conducted dozens of strikes in Africa - namely, Mali - since December 2021 alone.

To bridge this information gap, we compared how varying a country’s specific use and constraint of drones shapes the public’s perceptions of legitimacy, which scholars suggest can influence political officials’ use of force abroad.
